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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of life satisfaction in the labor market behavior of workers 
receiving welfare benefits while working. Welfare stigma and other hard-to-observe factors 
may affect outcomes as on-the-job search and the duration until leaving welfare status. We 
utilize life satisfaction to track such factors. The German PASS-ADIAB dataset combines 
administrative process data with individual survey data offering a rich database that allows 
conditioning on changes in household income, time-stable individual traits, employment 
biographies and local labor market effects. Given a broad set of further covariates, we find 
that life satisfaction of in-work benefit recipients is negatively associated with job search, 
whereas the duration until the exit from welfare is hardly affected. Focusing on heterogeneity 
among workers suggests that life satisfactions’ role for choice depends on the institutional 
setting, rendering marginally employed workers specifically prone to life satisfaction. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the job search behavior and success of employees receiving 
supplementary welfare benefits. In-work benefit programs allow employed workers to 
combine labor income and transfers when falling below a certain income level. In general, 
such programs constitute a monetary incentive to extend labor supply: workers are financially 
better off than unemployed welfare claimants. Besides the monetary incentive structure, non-
monetary factors may also shape the behavior of in-work workers. Welfare stigma – the 
psychological costs of being dependent on welfare – is such a broadly discussed factor. It 
makes entitled workers restrain themselves from applying for welfare benefits (Moffitt 1983, 
Besley and Coate 1992). While the monetary incentive structure is legally defined, and 
income is observable, welfare stigma is not directly observable. Hence, empirical 
identification relies on indirect proxies or simulations such as non-take-up rates of welfare-
entitled workers (Riphahn 2001) and information treatments in the field (Bhargava and 
Manoli 2015) or from the lab (Friedrichsen, König, and Schmacker 2018). This paper 
provides another way of assessing the behavioral consequences of non-monetary factors for 
labor market behavior. The economics of well-being literature examines hard-to-observe or 
non-monetary factors by using subjective well-being (SWB) as a predictor of behavior (Clark 
2016). We apply this approach to both the on-the-job search of in-work benefit recipients and 
leaving the welfare program. We examine the German case of in-work benefit recipients of 
Arbeitslosengeld II (‘unemployment benefits II,’ henceforth ‘UB II’). 
Three features position this paper in the literature. (1.) The choice of life satisfaction as a 
measure to explain the behavior of the employed. Previous papers on labor market behavior 
broadly speaking split into studies on employed workers with the domain of job satisfaction 
as a predictor of behavior, and those on unemployed workers with life satisfaction as a 
predictor for job search. This paper, in contrast, uses life satisfaction to explain the behavior 
of employed workers. Life satisfaction correlates negatively with welfare stigma (Krug, 
Drasch, and Jungbauer-Gans 2019, Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf 2020), whereas such evidence 
is missing for job satisfaction. Hence, life satisfaction enables us to take hard-to-observe 
factors outside the job domain into account. 
(2.) The choice of the target group of workers receiving in-work welfare benefits bridges 
the gap between two stands of literature on the behavioral consequences of SWB on labor 
markets. Studies on unemployed workers show diverging findings regarding the SWB effect 
on the job search and finding a job. While searching is negatively associated with life 
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satisfaction, the results for finding a job remain ambiguous (Gielen and van Ours 2014, 
Mavridis 2015, Rose and Stavrova 2019). Studies on employed workers focus on job 
satisfaction as a proxy for job characteristics that explain job mobility (Freeman 1978, Clark 
2001). Labor market institutions, the regulatory setting, or welfare stigma are rarely 
considered in both literature strands. As job search and labor mobility also take place among 
employed workers, the life satisfaction approach, known from studies on unemployed 
workers, is applied to employed UB II workers to examine the behavioral consequences of 
hard-to-observe stigma effects, excluding other non-pecuniary effects of unemployment on 
life satisfaction. 
(3.) The behavioral outcomes we examine are the on-the-job search of UB II workers and 
the duration until they leave welfare. Job search is an expression of the intention to leave the 
current job. Job search is costly, as the well-being experienced during the job search is 
unpleasant – it is one of the least pleasurable activities (Knabe et al. 2010, An Hoang and 
Knabe 2019, Wolf, Metzing, and Lucas 2019). Job search is the first step of a process that 
might end in job mobility (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009). Consequently, the second 
outcome we use is the duration of the actual change from UB II status to regular employment 
without in-work benefits. In doing so, we examine if life satisfaction affects the aim of the 
welfare program UB II: overcoming welfare dependency (German Social Code II, §1). 
This research agenda demands detailed information on labor market behavior, individual 
characteristics and biographies, and repeated information on life satisfaction. Such a 
demanding set of information is available and increasingly used by linking administrative and 
survey data (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2012, Böckerman et al. 2013). Therefore, we utilize 
PASS-ADIAB. It consists of an individual and household panel survey linked to 
administrative data from the German social security system and annual establishment data 
(Antoni and Bethmann 2019). The richness of the dataset makes it possible to extract the 
employment status from administrative records, and to obtain annual life satisfaction 
information, job search status from the survey as well as information on the respective firms 
of the UB II worker. The exact location of the establishment is linked and allows us to address 
local labor market and demand-side factors. As a methodological approach, we choose a panel 
analysis model with individual fixed effects to explain the job search (outcome 1) and a Cox 
proportional hazard model to estimate the duration until the actual UB II exit (outcome 2). 
We find evidence that life satisfaction is ceteris paribus, a relevant predictor for the labor 
market behavior of in-work benefit recipients. Lower life satisfaction is associated with an 
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increased likelihood of starting on-the-job search among UB II workers that go beyond the 
incentive arising from income. However, this finding holds for a sub-population of marginally 
employed UB II workers. The duration until successfully leaving UB II is hardly affected by 
the life satisfaction level. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual 
framework and related literature. Section 3 explains the institutional background of UB II, 
followed by Section 4, which introduces the PASS-ADIAB dataset. Section 5 explains the 
empirical estimation strategy. Section 6 summarizes descriptive statistics (6.1), the results for 
the on-the-job search (6.2, outcome 1), and the duration analysis of successfully leaving UB II 
(6.3, outcome 2). Section 7 discusses the findings, and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Subjective well-being and labor market behavior of working welfare recipients 
We describe the labor market behavior of UB II workers under the assumption that an 
intrinsic cost-benefit analysis drives their decision to act. Workers compare the benefits and 
costs of their employment status with the expected outside costs and benefits of a different 
labor market status. If the benefit-cost ratio of the outside status outweighs that of the current 
position, the workers act, e.g., start to search for a better job. Such an approach builds on the 
idea of a general on-the-job search framework that describes labor turnover if the utility from 
the current job is outweighed by the expected returns from outside job offers (Burdett 1978, 
Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994). We describe this relationship with a modified version of the 
Green (2010) turnover function. An 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 to change employment status – such as job search 
– is carried out if the inequation (2.1) holds.   
𝑢∗ − 𝑢 − 𝑐 > 0 (2.1) 
The decision to act depends on the relation between the expected utility of outside costs and 
benefits aggregated in 𝑢∗ and the current utility of costs and benefits of the current 
employment status in 𝑢. Searching for a job also has transaction costs (or benefits) that are 
expressed with 𝑐. If the outside state 𝑢∗ offers more utility than the current state 𝑢 together 
with the transaction costs 𝑐, the worker acts in order to obtain the other labor market state. 
Hence, observing that an in-work benefit worker remains without any search efforts in 
welfare dependency might be due to his perception of an in-work benefit job having a 
sufficiently high amount of benefits, or due to the perception of rather sobering outside 
opportunities or due to individually prohibitively high search costs. Any outside status is only 
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feasible if the search is not too costly. All three variables are subject to monetary and non-
monetary attributes. This paper distinguishes between such monetary and non-monetary 
factors that shape 𝑢 while holding the outside options 𝑢∗ and transaction costs 𝑐 constant in 
order to explain job search and the welfare duration of working welfare recipients. 
SWB makes it possible to distinguish between monetary and non-monetary attributes of 
labor market status (Schöb 2013). This distinction is needed to examine the extent to which 
life satisfaction is affected by the non-monetary aspects of an in-work benefit program. In 
general, the differentiation between monetary and non-monetary effects of such programs on 
SWB is rarely studied (Gregg, Harkness, and Smith 2009, Boyd-Swan et al. 2016). An 
exception is Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf (2020), who differentiate between income and life 
satisfaction effects of welfare dependency on employees. The authors find that UB II workers 
have reduced life satisfaction due to their welfare compared to workers with the same income 
but without in-work welfare. The (non-monetary) deviation from the non-dependency norm 
(“one should make one’s own living”) is described as a cause for the ceteris paribus reduced 
life satisfaction. They present evidence that UB II workers who put a high weight on such a 
work norm experience a severe reduction in life satisfaction due to welfare dependency. 
Using self-reported stigma consciousness points in the same direction: the higher the stigma 
consciousness, the lower the life satisfaction given the income of the welfare recipients (Krug, 
Drasch, and Jungbauer-Gans 2019). The evidence in this respect suggests that life satisfaction 
proxies the non-monetary welfare stigma of being an in-work benefit worker. 
In addition to welfare stigma, there are other non-monetary costs and benefits that shape 
𝑢, and, hence, labor market switches. Taking a process perspective, the initial step to switch 
status is the expression of the intention-to-quit succeeded by actual job search attempts 
(Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009). Observed individual life satisfaction changes, foremost 
due to job losses, are used for the distinction between income loss and the loss of non-
monetary benefits of a job. It is not that jobs are merely costly in terms of foregone leisure, 
however; they also offer substantial non-monetary benefits. For instance, in terms of identity 
(Hetschko, Knabe, and Schöb 2014), meaning (Cassar and Meier 2018) or individual 
autonomy (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2018). Unemployment deprives workers of the non-
monetary benefits of a job that is reflected in life satisfaction. As a behavioral consequence, 
unemployed with a more severe drop in life satisfaction search more frequently and more 
intensively for a new job (see Clark 2003, Mavridis 2015). Following this idea, we 
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hypothesize for UB II workers that the likelihood of a job search is negatively associated with 
life satisfaction given the income level of the workers. 
Examining the literature on re-employment reveals a less clear picture of the role of life 
satisfaction for the next step in the turnover process – the actual status change. Whereas Clark 
(2003) and Mavridis (2015) also find that lower life satisfaction due to unemployment leads 
to shorter unemployment durations and a higher likelihood of re-employment. Gielen and van 
Ours (2014) also find the above-mentioned increased job search effort due to reduced life 
satisfaction, but no correlation with actual unemployment duration. Self-reported stigma 
consciousness also affects search effort; however, this intensified effort does not result in 
more job interviews, nor does it increase the likelihood of leaving unemployment (Krug, 
Drasch, and Jungbauer-Gans 2019). A further strand of literature finds a rather non-linear 
association between SWB and re-employment (Krause 2013, Rose and Stavrova 2019). These 
papers find a hump-shaped association between SWB and unemployment duration and re-
employment likelihood. Consequently, a moderate well-being level maximizes the likelihood 
of re-employment. The reasons for the discrepancy of the empirical results regarding search 
efforts and duration of unemployment and re-employment are manifold. For instance, re-
employment and short unemployment periods require labor demand that matches the search 
efforts of the unemployed. Nevertheless, the demand side is hard to track and therefore might 
account for the unsuccessful search on the part of the unemployed (Gielen and van Ours 
2014). Some reported findings are also driven by or hold only for specific subgroups, such as 
men (Mavridis 2015), or relate to specific types of re-employment, such as self-employment 
(Krause 2013). Further, not all studies account for time-stable individual traits, whereas 
personality traits are identified as relevant for searching and finding a job. Hence, unobserved 
stable traits might bias well-being effects on behavioral outcomes or may cause diverging 
findings regarding job searching and re-employment (Krause 2013, Rose and Stavrova 2019). 
To estimate the role of life satisfaction in the duration until successfully leaving in-work 
benefits for a regular job, we also need evidence on the role of non-monetary job 
characteristics for employees. Simulations show that the importance of non-monetary job 
attributes is even more crucial for utility than monetary incentives (Sullivan and To 2014). 
The empirical literature examines non-monetary job attributes among employees foremost 
with job satisfaction to predict job quitting and job turnover. Early studies already suggest 
that lower job satisfaction is associated with a higher propensity to quit (Freeman 1978). 
More recent studies confirm this: ceteris paribus, job satisfaction is a significant negative 
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predictor for job quitting and labor mobility (see, for instance, Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey 
1998, Clark 2001, Lévy-Garboua, Montmarquette, and Simonnet 2007). This finding holds 
specifically beyond income. Structural, multi-equation models also use job satisfaction to 
account for hard-to-observe non-pecuniary aspects of a job, such as good relations to 
colleagues or advancement opportunities (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009, Cornelißen 
2009). Furthermore, comparable case studies on discrimination in specific occupations yield 
that job satisfaction, like life satisfaction, affects the likelihood of on-the-job search and 
quitting negatively. For instance, British ethnic minority nurses (Shields and Wheatley Price 
2002) and racially discriminated US military personnel (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2009) have 
a higher likelihood not to stay in their job due to reduced job satisfaction from discrimination. 
As we take general overall life satisfaction as a proxy for non-monetary factors, we assume 
that life satisfaction incorporates the effect of such non-monetary job attributes, too. Welfare 
stigma and non-monetary job attributes together affect life satisfaction. All things equal, we 
hypothesize that UB II workers with a reduced life satisfaction leave welfare faster to obtain a 
labor market status with the beneficial outside 𝑢∗. 
3. Institutional setting: Welfare while working 
The UB II in-work benefit program is part of the general German welfare system, which 
guarantees a socio-economic minimum income through welfare transfers. Hence, UB II is 
means-tested and it is granted to needy households. The neediness threshold of a household 
depends on the number of adults and children living in this household, the total household 
income, and the savings of the household.1 Consequently, UB II is granted to applying 
households irrespective of the reasons for its low income level. Unemployment of one or 
more adults, low earnings, or a high number of dependent children substantially increases the 
risks for UB II. However, UB II workers have a job. They live in households receiving UB II 
while having earnings from a job or self-employment. UB II workers “combine” earnings 
with welfare transfers. The self-earned income is not fully deducted from the welfare amount 
and, hence, they have a monetary incentive to work. The deduction plan of UB II defines the 
monetary incentives the UB II workers face and is the central part of the reform debate on UB 
II (Knabe 2005, Schöb 2020). Currently, UB II workers have an individual monthly 
allowance of 100 euros without deductions of the welfare amount. For a single adult 
 
1 The official German term for a UB II household is “Bedarfsgemeinschaft”.  
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household, the welfare deduction rate of each euro earned above 100 euros is 80 percent up to 
monthly earnings of 1,000 euros. For higher earnings, the deduction rate rises to 90 percent, 
and phases out at individual earnings of 1,200 euros. The transfer phase-out threshold is 
extended to 1,500 euros for households with dependent children (for more institutional details 
see Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf 2020, section 3). 
In principle, UB II workers face the same monetary incentive structure that leads to the 
same financial outcomes. However, two crucial differences among the UB II workers are 
present: the employment regulation and the job search obligation. (1) The job might be either 
regular or marginal. UB II workers in regular employment pay full social security payroll tax. 
Marginal employment (ME), or so-called “Minijobber” (henceforth: ME UB II) are restricted 
to jobs with monthly earnings below 451 euros, which comes along with fewer working hours 
and lower wage rates. ME UB II workers’ earnings are not subject to social security 
contributions for the employee. As a result, such a scheme is often used to provide secondary 
employment, and more importantly, it is suitable for workers who are officially registered 
unemployed (Lietzmann, Schmelzer, and Wiemers 2017). (2) In principle, UB II welfare 
comes along with the obligation to search for a job to overcome the neediness by own 
earnings. This holds for UB II workers who have a job. ME UB II workers search more often, 
and they are also more often have an obligation to search from their respective Jobcenter 
(Bähr et al. 2018). About half of UB II workers are marginally employed. Another difference 
between UB II workers and other workers are the non-pecuniary attributes of the jobs carried 
out with in-work benefits. For instance, the jobs UB II workers have are more often 
temporary, leading to more reports of worries about losing the job (also for non-temporary 
jobs) or autonomy at work is perceived lower (Achatz and Gundert 2017).  
4. Data 
This study utilizes PASS-ADIAB 7515 that combines survey data from the annual household 
panel study Labour Market and Social Security (henceforth PASS, see Trappmann et al. 
(2013)) with administrative labor market information from registers of the German Federal 
Employment Agency using record linkage techniques (Antoni and Bethmann 2019). Several 
advantages make PASS-ADIAB particularly compelling for this analysis. First, PASS 
oversamples households receiving welfare, guaranteeing a sufficiently high number of cases 
of UB II workers. Furthermore, the presence of individual panel data on life satisfaction and a 
broad set of life circumstances allows individual fixed effects to be applied. Also, the linked 
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administrative register data allow for more reliable information on welfare dependency as this 
information comes from the welfare administration instead of self-reported welfare reports. 
The avoidance of error-prone survey answers on transfer dependency helps to account for 
misreporting of UB II status (Bruckmeier, Müller, and Riphahn 2014). The detailed register 
information on the exact date of specific employment status is also an essential feature for 
estimating precise survival curves for UB II status as well as for accounting for employment 
biographies by generating measures for job tenure, welfare biographies, and the labor market 
histories of the UB II workers. Another advantageous feature of administrative data is the 
availability of a firm-identifier, which makes it possible to merge establishment information 
for each UB II worker. Furthermore, PASS-ADIAB supplies county-level information on the 
location of the establishment, allowing us to control location-specific factors. 
The foundation of the working sample consists of the respondents of the PASS panel 
study. The initial wave of the annual survey, with approximately 18,000 persons in about 
12,000 households, was drawn in December 2006/2007. The PASS study consists of two 
survey populations facing the same questionnaire design, one of which represents the German 
residential population, while the other is a random sample from the UB II recipient register 
(Trappmann et al. 2010, 2013). The administrative records that are, in principle, linkable to 
PASS contains each person in Germany who was subject to social security (since 1975), in 
marginal employment (since 1999), a recipient of benefits from unemployment insurance 
(since 1975), and a recipient of UB II (since 2005) as well as a registered job seeker at the 
employment agency or a participant in an active labor market program. Hence, in principle, 
all UB II workers have at least one record in the administrative IEB data. The maximum 
possible spell for which information is available starts on the 1st of January 1975 and ends on 
the 31st December 2014 for PASS-ADIAB 7515 (Antoni and Bethmann 2019).  
For the working sample, we use the PASS-ADIAB 7515 scientific use file that consists of 
respondents from PASS waves 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. 
The first PASS survey wave (2006/2007) is dropped due to subsequent changes in the 
questionnaire design. Moreover, we cannot use PASS wave 9 (2015) due to the lack of 
administrative records for that year. Furthermore, the working sample consists of workers 
who granted linkage consent for the administrative records during the survey process. The 
selectivity from denied linkage consent is small with a weak tendency towards persons who 
have fewer privacy concerns, and therefore, having fewer missing values on sensible 
variables. In general, the average linkage consent rate is 81 percent. Estimations on socio-
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demographic outcomes suggest that consent bias does not change the results significantly 
(Beste 2011, Antoni and Bethmann 2019). We form the UB II workers sample from those 
PASS respondents who granted consent. A respondent qualifies as a UB II worker if, on the 
PASS survey interview day, she has an overlap of an administrative employment spell 
(regular employment or marginal employment on indicator ‘erwstat’) and a UB II welfare 
spell (registered UB II recipient who is indicated as an adult and employable on the variables 
‘quelle’ and ‘erwstat’). Over all waves, this leads to N = 7,516 cases of UB II workers. In 
total, the working sample shrinks to N = 4,016 UB II workers by dropping all the observations 
without information on job search, life satisfaction, and all applied covariates.    
Job search is generated from the PASS survey question: 
In the past four weeks, have you been looking for. . . 
(1) a different job, (2) an additional job, (3) no job at all, or (4) an additional as well as for a 
different job. The binary outcome variable is defined such that (3) becomes No = 0, and (1), 
(2), and (4) as Yes = 1.2  
The duration until successfully ending UB II are the days between the onset of the risk of 
leaving UB II and leaving UB II for regular employment without welfare. It defines a 
successful exit as the day on which a UB II spell ends, and within the following five days, an 
employment spell is observed. Working UB II episodes not ending within the period of 
observation are right-censored on the 31st December 2014 and kept for the survival analysis 
dataset.  
Regarding the two outcome variables, we condition on essential factors affecting either 
UB II entitlement (such as household income, cohabitation, and the number of children in the 
household) and job search (such as tenure, working hours, and firm characteristics). For a 
comprehensive summary of all covariates, see Appendix A1. 
5. Estimation strategies 
5.1 On-the-job search of UB II workers 
We examine the role of non-monetary factors in the on-the-job search of UB II workers by 
estimating a linear probability model with individual fixed effects. The outcome is whether a 
 
2 A detailed overview of the generation of dependent and independent variables from PASS-ADIAB is available 
in Appendix A1. 
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UB II worker is searching for a new job or not ((𝐽𝑆) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑠;  0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)). The model 
is expressed by the equation: 
𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4ℎ𝑖𝑡
2  
+ 𝒋𝒐𝒃′𝛽𝑗𝑜𝑏 + 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎′𝛽𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝒔𝒐𝒄′𝛽𝑠𝑜𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5.1) 
We estimate the latent likelihood of 𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1 of a UB II worker 𝑖 at the interview wave 𝑡. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, which states the partial correlation between life satisfaction (𝐿𝑆) 
and the likelihood of searching. Such types of longitudinal linear probability models are 
applied in related works on non-experimental labor supply decisions of in-work benefit 
recipients (Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007) and estimations on mental health affecting 
employment rates in register data (Greve and Nielsen 2013). The SWB and job search 
literature either rely on past life satisfaction changes from job loss to explain a current binary 
outcome (Clark 2003, Gielen and van Ours 2014) or does not account for individual fixed 
effects (Krause 2013, Rose and Stavrova 2019).  
The identification of the 𝛽1-coefficient rests on the assumption that 𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 is not 
endogenous. We choose a longitudinal probability model to avoid the arbitrary process of 
choosing the “correct” past life satisfaction (change) relevant to the current job search 
decision. Job search and life satisfaction are measured at the same point in time (the interview 
date). This comes at the cost of a higher risk for reverse causality that might also run from job 
search to well-being. This is specifically the case as job search is among the least pleasurable 
activities for experienced well-being that is associated with life satisfaction (Knabe et al. 
2010, Wolf, Metzing, and Lucas 2019). However, we tolerate this caveat as we are able to 
address this issue with sensitivity analysis, whereas two other potential sources of biases are 
ruled out with our approach. Taking past life satisfaction would require two consecutive steps: 
one change in life satisfaction at an arbitrary point in time and using this life satisfaction 
change for the search estimation. Therefore, the risk of a selective outflow from the UB II 
status depending on life satisfaction between step one and step two are severe. Especially, 
Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf (2020) show that the likelihood of experiencing a status transition 
(either to regular employment or to unemployment) is correlated with life satisfaction. 
Besides, the elapsed time in a two-step procedure is prone to adaption in life satisfaction 
(Gielen and van Ours 2014). By examining job search and life satisfaction simultaneously, we 
overcome both two limitations. As a sensitivity analysis, we show that past life satisfaction 
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also influences today’s search decisions and that the effect is not the opposite direction (see 
Appendix A4).  
Another source of endogeneity is the omission of relevant covariates of job search. Here, 
the richness of PASS-ADIAB with its combination of administrative and survey information 
is beneficial and allows to reduce the risk for biased estimates. To distinguish between 
monetary and non-monetary factors, we need an appropriate proxy that allows us to keep the 
monetary circumstance of the labor market status fixed. Therefore, we control for monthly 
disposable household income 𝑦. Household income positively correlates with earnings, which 
express the monetary value of a job (Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994). Furthermore, it proxies 
three additional monetary factors that would otherwise affect life satisfaction. Household 
income is also positively correlated to one’s partner’s earnings. Consequently, it constitutes 
the central UB II eligibility criteria that shape the prospects of leaving UB II (Hetschko, 
Schöb, and Wolf 2020). As household income approximates consumption possibilities as 
well, we use a log-linear specification to reflect the diminishing returns of consumption for 
well-being (Stevenson and Wolfers 2013). Working hours ℎ and hours squared ℎ2 reflect the 
opportunity costs of being at work and are an essential job characteristic workers care about 
(Grün, Hauser, and Rhein 2010). Hence, we also control for non-linear associations between 
working time and life satisfaction. Under perfect market clearing, income and hours allow 
considering the wage rate.  
Job characteristics, however, turn out to be important predictors of job search beyond 
income (Delfgaauw 2007). Hence, we control for job characteristics by using the vector 𝒋𝒐𝒃, 
which encompasses indicators for individual tenure at the firm and an indicator for fixed-term 
contracts that shape the decision for on-the-job search, too. Firm-specific factors also 
influence the decision to search. These factors are addressed by the vector of controls 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎. 
Individual socio-demographic characteristics are considered by the vector 𝒔𝒐𝒄 encompassing 
a health status control as well as family characteristics such as cohabitation and the number of 
children in the household. Specifically, the latter are also determinants of the UB II 
entitlement that is granted on the household level (see section 3).  
Unobserved individual characteristics are essential covariates that affect job search and 
employment transitions (Krause 2013, Rose and Stavrova 2019). Therefore, we focus also on 
the unobserved heterogeneity among the workers. One strategy in well-being research is the 
inclusion of individual fixed effects (here: 𝛼𝑖) that condition the estimation on time-stable 
individual traits that affect, for instance, life satisfaction, income and job search (Ferrer-i-
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Carbonell and Frijters 2004). However, some other unobserved traits are not entirely stable 
over time and, therefore, potential confounders of life satisfaction association. The locus of 
control is such a trait that may alter depending on the employment status (Preuss and 
Hennecke 2018). As a consequence, we control for administrative employment biographies of 
the UB II workers, too. Such biographical measures typically from administrative records 
affect labor market outcomes and allow to proxy unobserved heterogeneity that might alter 
over time (Caliendo, Mahlstedt, and Mitnik 2017). Specifically, the total number of transfer 
episodes and the total days in UB II since its introduction 2005 should correlate with time-
varying heterogeneity in personality.     
The search behavior is affected by the labor demand by the firms around. In terms of a 
search model, job search depends on the individual expectations about the job offer arrival 
rate. A search without any opportunity to receive a job offer might be felt to be a hopeless 
endeavor (Gielen and van Ours 2014). Hence, we need to make labor demand comparable 
between the different workers. Therefore, we introduce county-specific fixed effects 𝜑𝑘 in 
order to address local labor market effects. Hence, we estimate the likelihood of searching, 
given that the UB II workers remain under the same labor market conditions.  
The wave controls 𝜏𝑡 completes the estimation equation and further controls for business 
cycle aspects. We use a linear probability model as the estimation technique. However, logit 
models are also a suitable solution for binary outcomes, and we estimate the same model with 
the conditional logit estimator with fixed effects.3 
 
5.2 Duration analysis: Outflow sample towards working without welfare 
In a second step, we examine the duration until successfully leaving welfare for regular 
employment without welfare dependency. We examine if life satisfaction shows an 
association with the duration of being in the UB II worker state. The exit into regular 
employment indicates the end of a process that is initiated by the job search. To estimate the 
time for such an outflow sample, we use a proportional hazard model with continuous time 
(Jenkins 2005). We estimate the hazard rate ℎ(𝑠) with s representing the number of days of 
working while being a welfare recipient. The model is estimated in the following form:  
 
3 The results are presented in Appendix A2 and A3. The signs of the coefficients confirm the findings of the 
linear probability model. The magnitude of the logit coefficients is not directly comparable to coefficients of the 
linear probability model. 
  13 
ℎ(𝑠|𝐿𝑆,  𝑿,  𝑢) = ℎ0(𝑠) exp(𝛽1𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2ln (𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3ℎ + 𝛽4ℎ
2 
+ 𝒋𝒐𝒃′𝛽𝑗𝑜𝑏 + 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎′𝛽𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝒔𝒐𝒄′𝛽𝑠𝑜𝑐 + 𝑿
′𝛽 + 𝑢) 
(5.2) 
We examine the hazard rate ℎ(s) describing the chance of successfully leaving UB II for each 
day 𝑠 since the beginning of the UB II episode. The number of days s between the onset of the 
chance to the failure event (= successfully leaving UB II) is the increment to be explained.4 
We estimate a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model, and so we do not need to 
assume a specific form of the baseline hazard function ℎ0(𝑠) as long as the proportional 
hazard assumption over time holds. As a robustness check, we redo the procedure with a 
parametric Weibull baseline hazard function (Luecke 2018).5   
Analogously to the model in 5.1, life satisfaction 𝐿𝑆 is the variable of interest. The other 
vectors of covariates are part of the estimated model to condition on the socio-demographic, 
firm, and job characteristics of the UB II workers that experience the successful end to 
welfare. We make the usual assumption that the explanatory variables from the last interview 
before the exit event are stable over time. For instance, in the case of the last PASS interview 
having taken place 143 days before leaving UB II, the life satisfaction score from that 
interview is assumed to be valid during the remaining days until the exit event occurs.  
By taking the within worker perspective in the job search model 5.1, we control time-
stable characteristics. Nevertheless, duration models require a different data structure that 
restricts the possibility for individual fixed effects as units of analysis are expiring UB II 
episodes. Consequently, the number of occurrences of the exit event during the observation 
period determines how often an individual appears in the dataset. Due to the low number of 
cases of repeated occurrences, individual fixed effects are not feasible here. Hence, we rely on 
additional (time-stable) covariates in vector 𝑿. Namely, we rely on controls that proxy 
personality traits and human capital as well as gender to account for between UB II worker 
differences that may also affect the duration of successful leaving UB II. 
 
4 A successful end of an UB II episode of a worker (= failure) is assigned if a working episode with no UB II 
parallel to the UB spell follows immediately afterwards. A maximum of four days of non-work between end-of-
UB II and working is accepted.       
5 Results are presented in Appendix A6. 
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6. Results 
6.1 On-the-job search of UB II workers 
The target group of UB II workers differs from the rest of the German workforce. UB II 
workers work fewer hours with fewer earnings, and, on average, they are less satisfied with 
life. Earnings affect the household income and, consequently, the UB II entitlement 
(Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf 2020). We are interested in the search behavior of UB II 
workers. We, therefore, differentiate between the characteristics of searching UB II workers 
and non-searching UB II workers. Table 1 depicts these differences. UB II workers searching 
for a job are 0.5187 points less satisfied with life (𝑝 < 0.001). Of course, we cannot claim 
that the difference in life satisfaction causally induces job search. For instance, a 
complementary factor potentially inducing job search is a lower salary that is reflected in 
€154.51 less monthly household income of the searching UB II workers (𝑝 < 0.001).6 This is 
a pecuniary incentive to seek a better-paid job. Employment contracts also differ considerably. 
The share of workers with a fixed-term contract is higher in the group of job seekers. Hence, 
this employment is more prone to the necessity of finding a new job. A substantial share of 
ME UB II workers do not search for a new job, although their monthly earnings are limited to 
450 euros a month (see section 3). 
The UB II workers, in general, differ from other employees in that they are more 
frequently employed in a rather small set of service jobs. Cleaning jobs, cooks, salesperson, 
drivers, and waiters account for about 25 percent of all UB II workers (Achatz and Gundert 
2017). Nevertheless, within the UB II workers, there are minor differences between seekers 
and non-seekers regarding the job requirements that are assigned to the specific occupation. In 
particular, workers at the lowest level of job requirements more frequently search for a new 
job. The job seekers among the UB II workers cohabit less often, and the number of 
dependent children in the household is lower. Both point to the role of household 
composition, which may affect the job search decision of UB II workers.  
The lower panel of Table 1 shows time-stable (cross-sectional) characteristics. UB II 
workers with higher educational attainment have a higher likelihood of job search, potentially 
reflecting better outside job options. Slightly over two-thirds of UB II workers are female, the 
share of males is a bit higher among the searching UB II workers. In PASS wave five, a 
 
6 The monthly gross earnings are surveyed for a subgroup of UB II workers only. The difference is 
 € 136.18 (𝑝 < 0.000) for them. 
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psychological standard measure for personality traits – the so-called Big Five – was surveyed. 
We extrapolated the respective scores for the five traits to all the other waves of the same 
person under the assumption that they remain stable over time. Searching UB II workers 
differ significantly from non-searching UB II workers. Job seekers have higher scores for 
extraversion (𝑝 =  0.0912), conscientiousness (𝑝 =  0.0538), and openness (𝑝 =  0.0375 ). 
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Table 1: Characteristics of UB II workers by job search 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: ./. denotes cells with information that are censored by IAB data processing due to very low 
number of cases. a The number of cases deviates from the longitudinal panel above due to missing 
values. b Big 5 indicators were surveyed exclusively in PASS wave 5. We transferred these traits to all 
other available PASS waves of the same person under the assumption of time stability. 
6.2 Does life satisfaction affect job search? 
In order to address the association of life satisfaction with the on-the-job search of UB II 
workers over time, we estimate a linear probability model with individual fixed effects. Table 
2 shows the results. In (1), a baseline model shows the association of within-person life 
No Yes
Mean / Pct. Std. Dev. Mean / Pct. Std. Dev.
Life satisfaction 6.59 1.84 6.07 1.97
Monthly household income (disposable, in €) 1,389.33 648.35 1,234.82 570.11
Actual working hours (per week) 26.33 14.40 18.87 14.07
Tenure (in years) 2.91 3.73 2.31 3.04
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes 4.77 3.90 4.69 3.54
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) 5.03 2.40 5.35 2.40
Fixed-term contract (in %) 22.84 26.55
Marginal Employment (in %)  26.83 56.60
Job requirements: Level 1 (in %)  41.28  46.35
Job requirements: Level 2 (in %) 52.49 46.04
Job requirements: Level 3 (in %) 3.19 3.57
Job requirements: Level 4 (in %) 3.04 4.04
Active trade union member (in %) 3.63 4.81
Establishment: 1-20 employees (in %) 41.06 48.21
Establishment: 21-100 employees (in %) 30.21 21.12
Establishment: 101-500 employees (in %) 19.94 21.43
Establishment: 501-2000 employees (in %) ./. ./.
Establishment: 2000+ employees (in %) ./. ./.
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years (in %) 19.17 20.65
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 5-9 years (in %) 17.16 18.09
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years (in %) 32.29 30.98
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years (in %) 30.72 30.28
Cohabitation (in %) 47.25 37.97
Number of children in household 1.01 1.11 0.84 1.02
Age bracket: 18-32 (in %) 18.99 17.00
Age bracket: 33-42 (in %) 26.98 24.61
Age bracket: 43-51 (in %) 27.82 32.61
Age bracket: 52-61 (in %) 26.21 25.78
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) 2.45 4.53 2.60 4.66
Number of observations (pooled)
N =a 
Big Five personality trait: extraversionb 3.52 0.86 3.56 0.80 2,823
Big Five personality trait: agreeablenessb 3.24 0.71 3.27 0.73 2,823
Big Five personality trait: conscientiousnessb 4.12 0.58 4.16 0.56 2,822
Big Five personality trait: neuroticismb 2.83 0.81 2.86 0.82 2,823
Big Five personality trait: opennessb 3.57 0.50 3.61 0.49 2,818
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 1-2 (in %) 26.40 23.42 4,008
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 3 (in %) 54.57 52.37 4,008
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 4-6 (in %) 19.02 24.20 4,008
Gender: Male (in %) 34.42 37.40 4,014
On-the-job search
2,728 1,288
Time-stable characteristics within UB II worker
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satisfaction changes and the on-the-job search likelihood of UB II workers. Household 
income, working hours, and socio-demographic controls, as well as firm-specific factors, are 
added in (2). Column (3) incorporates the local labor market by introducing county fixed 
effects. 
Table 2: Job search of UB II workers and life satisfaction 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
In all three columns, life satisfaction shows a statistically significant negative coefficient that 
changes only slightly with the stepwise integration of controls. Increasing (decreasing) life 
satisfaction is accompanied by a decreasing (increasing) propensity to search for another job. 
In column (3), a one-point increase in life satisfaction is accompanied by a 1.76 percentage-
point lower likelihood of job search (𝑝 < 0.0189). As we focus exclusively on the within-
person perspective, observed, but time-stable, factors (e.g., gender) and unobserved time-
stable factors are controlled and do not bias these results. Working time shows a negative 
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.0220 *** 0.0075 -0.0160 ** 0.0074 -0.0176 ** 0.0075
Monthly household income (ln) -0.0316 0.0341 -0.0307 0.0343
Hours -0.0130 *** 0.0040 -0.0137 *** 0.0040
Hours (sq) 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0002 *** 0.0001
Tenure 0.0152 0.0113 0.0142 0.0114
Tenure (sq) -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0008
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.0465 0.0371 0.0457 0.0375
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.2320 *** 0.0522 0.2331 *** 0.0538
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0105 0.0415 0.0072 0.0424
Job requirements: Level 3 -0.0773 0.0929 -0.0792 0.0926
Job requirements: Level 4 0.1104 0.0869 0.1102 0.0875
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 0.0486 0.0621 0.0380 0.0613
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.0659 0.0494 0.0598 0.0504
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.0994 * 0.0576 0.0839 0.0583
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 0.0516 0.0716 0.0344 0.0743
Establishment: 2000+ employees -0.2507 0.1948 -0.2669 0.1954
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.0744 0.0460 -0.0638 0.0467
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.0537 0.0407 -0.0481 0.0408
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.0616 0.0520 -0.0614 0.0520
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.0312 0.0663 0.0308 0.0681
Number of children in household 0.0234 0.0368 0.0327 0.0374
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0246 0.0688 -0.0147 0.0746
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.0627 0.0701 -0.0450 0.0696
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.0588 0.0933 -0.0431 0.0936
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0008 0.0025
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.0337 ** 0.0170 -0.0318 * 0.0178
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) -0.0342 0.0314 -0.0322 0.0317
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coefficient; the likelihood of searching becomes lower, the more hours UB II workers work 
per week. Household income remains insignificant. Controlling for individual earnings 
instead of household income yields a negative coefficient (see Appendix A4, col. 4-6). The 
insignificant household income coefficient is thus a sign that other income sources (like 
earnings of a partner) affect job search with the opposite sign. These findings are in line with 
standard models of on-the-job search (Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994). The estimation 
combines UB II workers in marginal employment as well as regular employed UB II workers. 
Even given the working hours, marginal employment is a strictly positive predictor of job 
search. An extensive transfer biography is the strongest negative predictor for job search. The 
likelihood of searching for another job drops with each additional transfer episode in the past 
by more than three percentage points. It is remarkable that despite a comprehensive set of 
controls, life satisfaction remains a significant predictor that supplements the explanatory 
power and shows a negative sign.  
Life satisfaction and job search a both measured at the same point in time. Hence, reverse 
causality might be an issue. As a sensitivity check, we substitute lagged life satisfaction (t-1) 
for current life satisfaction. Past satisfaction is not affected by current dissatisfaction due to 
job search. Furthermore, we combine current and lagged satisfaction measures in one 
estimation together as predictors for job search (see Appendix A4, col. 1-3). The results show 
that changes in life satisfaction in the past and also past and current life satisfaction together 
are negatively associated with job search. This makes us confident that it is not job search that 
reverses the causal direction.    
Table 3 attempts to understand the channel through which life satisfaction affects search 
behavior. Initially, we address the heterogeneity among UB II workers and estimate the role 
of marginal employment in column (1) since ME UB II workers are confronted with different 
individual and institutional constraints regarding, for instance, their time budget. The role of 
the German ‘Jobcenter’ as a government body that ‘activates’ UB II workers is examined in 
column (2). These ‘Jobcenters’ attempt to incentivize transfer recipients to overcome welfare 
dependency – for instance, they impose the obligation to search for a job on the UB II worker 
(Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf 2020). Column 3 examines the role of perceived job security, 
which is known as an essential determinant of job search (Clark, Knabe, and Rätzel 2010).7  
 
7 For all three estimations, we do not include county fixed effects as this would prevent the maximum likelihood 
function from converging. 
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Table 3: Job search of UB II workers and life satisfaction: Institutions and expectations 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Column 1 
is the same specification as Table 2, column 2. Column 2 shows the same specification, but 
without wave seven as no information on the Jobcenter contacts and search obligation is available 
for PASS-ADIAB wave 7. Column 3 shows the estimation results for within-person changes 
between wave seven and wave eight that offer information on worries about future job loss. 
The role of marginal employment (ME) for the search behavior of UB II workers is examined 
in column 1. The baseline likelihood to search for ME UB II workers is about 40 percentage 
points higher than the likelihood of regularly employed UB II workers. The interaction effect 
of life satisfaction with marginal employment shows that a one-point increase in life 
satisfaction reduces the likelihood of ME UB II workers for job search by 3.7 percentage 
points (𝑝 < 0.0034) while for regularly employed UB II workers no significant coefficient 
emerges. As a sensitivity check, we estimate the model above separately for ME UB II 
workers and for regularly employed UB II workers (see Table A5 in the Appendix for the 
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.0050 0.0089 -0.0212 * 0.0112 -0.0110 0.0145
ME = 1 × Life satisfaction -0.0323 *** 0.0110
Number of contacts to Jobcenter -0.0175 0.0411
Jobcenter: Obligation to search for a job = 1 0.1726 *** 0.0375
Expectations: Worries about future job loss = 1 0.1112 ** 0.0485
Monthly household income (ln) -0.0318 0.0339 -0.0149 0.0500 0.0121 0.0604
Hours -0.0131 *** 0.0040 -0.0158 ** 0.0077 -0.0221 ** 0.0094
Hours (sq) 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 ** 0.0001
Tenure 0.0163 0.0113 0.0183 0.0154 0.0144 0.0208
Tenure (sq) -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0010 0.0013
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.0474 0.0372 0.0222 0.0533 0.0695 0.0966
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.4108 *** 0.1029 0.2034 ** 0.0867 0.1227 0.0999
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0071 0.0416 -0.0449 0.0557 0.0833 0.1438
Job requirements: Level 3 -0.0719 0.0929 -0.0784 0.1219
Job requirements: Level 4 0.1043 0.0887 0.0069 0.1204 0.1338 0.2071
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 0.0459 0.0633 -0.0118 0.1019 -0.1532 0.1422
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.0673 0.0495 -0.0007 0.0650 -0.0088 0.1318
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.1016 * 0.0575 -0.0494 0.0783 0.1004 0.1255
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 0.0506 0.0713 -0.1781 0.1090 0.2525 0.2102
Establishment: 2000+ employees -0.2480 0.1935 -0.4925 *** 0.1733 0.2084 0.1825
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.0716 0.0459 -0.0889 0.0590 -0.0708 0.0924
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.0532 0.0406 -0.1446 *** 0.0547 -0.0006 0.1162
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.0620 0.0520 -0.1439 ** 0.0722 -0.0724 0.1155
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.0296 0.0658 0.0155 0.0895 0.0023 0.1774
Number of children in household 0.0234 0.0367 0.1207 ** 0.0539 -0.1019 0.0839
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0179 0.0676 -0.1530 0.0974 0.1113 0.1879
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.0659 0.0698 0.0273 0.0971 -0.0678 0.1576
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.0649 0.0931 0.0736 0.1314 -0.1841 0.2184
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0007 0.0025 -0.0051 0.0041 0.0042 0.0065
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.0336 0.0170 -0.0030 0.0262 -0.0953 0.0518
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) -0.0354 0.0314 -0.0243 0.0467 -0.0664 0.0642
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results). For marginally employed UB II workers, we find a negative life satisfaction 
coefficient of -0.0216 (𝑝 < 0.0849). Estimating the model solely for regular employed UB II 
workers does not yield any significant association of life satisfaction with the likelihood for 
job search (The 𝛽1-coefficient is -0.009 (𝑝 < 0.3545)). We take this as evidence for the 
negative association found in Table 2 and Table 3, col. 1 is due to the marginal employed UB 
II workers. 
Column 2 of Table 3 examines if Jobcenters or life satisfaction are the driving forces 
behind the job search of UB II workers. Hence, we complement two control variables for the 
contact with the local Jobcenter. We suppose that the number of personal contacts to the 
Jobcenter and the self-reported obligation-to-search imposed by the case managers affects life 
satisfaction, and henceforth the job search behavior. 51 Percent of the UB II workers 
confirming that an obligation by the Jobcenter is imposed.8 We find that the life satisfaction 
coefficient remains roughly the same when we add both controls. Unsurprisingly, reporting 
that one has the personal obligation to search increases the likelihood to search. Nevertheless, 
the negative association of life satisfaction with job search remains statistically significant, 
given that this obligation applies. Hence, the supposed association via the case mangers is not 
sufficient to explain the association between life satisfaction and job search. To dig deeper 
into the role of institutional pressure (or activation measures), we run a sensitivity analysis to 
differentiate between UB II workers with different institutional pressure to search. In the UB 
II workers sample are 55,7 percent are registered as unemployed, meaning that these workers 
have signed an “Eingliederungsvereinbarung” contract where they state that they actively 
search for a job. However, compliance with this agreement is rather weak. Controlling for 
such registered job seekers confirms that life satisfaction plays a genuine role in job search as 
the life satisfaction coefficient also remains significant and negative (-0.0157, 𝑝 < 0.0328). 
Column 3 of Table 3 examines the role of job insecurity for job search of UB II workers. 
UB II workers worried about their job security may have a higher intrinsic motivation for job 
search than workers perceiving their job as safe. PASS-ADIAB has two waves available with 
information on the worries about a future job loss (wave 7 and 8). This considerably reduces 
the number of cases and yields coefficients of a first-difference estimation. The results show 
 
8 The exact question from the question of PASS wave 8 is: “Not everyone who obtains unemployment benefit II 
(”Arbeitslosengeld II”) is expected by the Jobcenter to look for work, for example because this person is 58 
years of age or older, looks after children, cares for relatives or is ill. How about you? Does the Jobcenter expect 
you to look for work?” 
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that worries about future job loss are associated with job search, whereas the life satisfaction 
coefficient becomes insignificant. Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out that the insignificant 
coefficient of life satisfaction results from the low number of cases and not from adding the 
qualitative effect of expectations.9 It remains partially open whether a low level of life 
satisfaction is the channel for anticipating future unemployment. 
We carry out several sensitivity checks on the estimation technique, too. The results of 
Table 2 (see Appendix A2) and Table 3 (see Appendix A3) from a conditional logit model 
with individual fixed effects do not differ qualitatively. As heterogeneity analysis, we 
estimate the model of Table 2 by gender and find that the negative life satisfaction coefficient 
is driven by the women among the UB II workers. 
 
6.3 Duration until successfully ending UB II episodes 
We investigate the relationship of life satisfaction to a second outcome variable: the duration 
of the UB II episode of employees. The chosen successful UB II episodes are spells with 
follow-up employment within five days after leaving UB II welfare. Thus, we exclude all 
episodes ending in unemployment or with longer records gaps after leaving UB II. This 
restriction also applies to brief interruptions to enduring working UB II episodes. Overall, this 
procedure considerably reduces the number of available episodes (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Number of cases of UB II episodes and exit events 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: 1 counts all spells with valid information on the ending of the spell; 2 counts all spells that 
are right-censored at the 31st December 2014; 3 counts spells that end with a subsequent episode 
of working without UB II (gaps of less than 5 days are allowed); 4 counts episodes that end with 
subsequent episodes of UBII and officially registration as a job seeker. 
In principle, the observed episodes (2) and (3) in Table 4 are suitable for the evaluation of the 
duration of exposure. As we additionally use control variables with missing values, the 
 
9 Estimations with the same reduced sample size of column 3, Table 3 without the „worries about job loss“ - 
dummy lead to an insignificant life satisfaction coefficient (-0.0125, p < 0.3890). 
N = 
UB II worker 4,016
1    of those with information on exit status 2,886
2        of those with right-censored spell 1,073
3        of those ending successfully 605
4        of those ending in unemployment 1,208
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number of episodes shrinks to a total of N = 987 with 469 observed successful UB II exit 
events.  
The median length of the sample of a successful working UB II episode is 412 days. The 
mean duration is higher due to a group of mid- to long-term UB II spells which are right-
censored at the 31st December 2014. These findings correspond to results showing UB II 
status is persistent as two-thirds of UB II workers are still or again in UB II within one year. 
The other third of all UB II workers leave UB II – not all successful – within one year 
(Bruckmeier et al. 2013). To obtain a descriptive impression of the impact of life satisfaction 
on the duration of successful episodes, we estimate Cox survival curves depending on well-
being (low/high) and search activity (no/yes), as shown in Figure 1. 
  23 
Figure 1: Survival time estimates of UB II workers with exit event “regular employment” 
 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: The upper panel of Figure 1 depicts Cox survival time curves of UB II workers with the exit 
event regular employment differentiated by their life satisfaction at the last interview before UB II 
exit. The solid line represents workers who reported a life satisfaction of 0-6, the dashed line is the 
curve for workers with a life satisfaction of 7-10. The lower panel of Figure 1 depicts Cox survival 
time curves of UB II workers with the exit event regular employment differentiated by the job 
search status reported at the last interview before UB II exit. The solid line represents workers 
who reported no job search, while the dashed line is the curve for workers who reported job 
search. 
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The estimated survival curves depict the relative survival propensity for each day until the 
successful UB II exit. The upper panel shows the survival curves with the dashed line 
representing reports of high life satisfaction (7-10 life satisfaction score at the last interview 
before exit), while the solid line shows the same trend, but for low life satisfaction reports (0-
6 life satisfaction scores). The 95% confidence intervals almost wholly overlap, suggesting 
that life satisfaction is not associated with the duration of successful leaving UB II.  
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the survival curves of UB II workers differentiated by 
reporting job search or not. Hence, it indicates if labor market behavior affects successful UB 
II episodes. The solid line depicts workers who did not search for a job, and the dashed line 
indicates episodes of workers reporting job search within the last four weeks (the outcome 
variable of section 6.2). In contrast to differentiation by life satisfaction, in the case of job 
search, we see some systematic differences in the survival curves: the solid non-search line is 
completely located below the dashed search line. This means that searching UB II workers 
always have a lower hazard of successfully leaving their status of UB II worker to move into 
regular employment. However, this puzzling result needs to be addressed in a multivariate 
framework as one would expect that searching UB II workers leave UB II faster, whereas the 
descriptive results show the opposite. 
We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model to examine the role of life satisfaction in 
the duration of UB II ending successfully. Initially, we regress the hazard rate solely on life 
satisfaction to validate the descriptive findings (Table 5, col. 1). Column 2 adds the covariates 
of the job search model in section 6.2. As individual fixed effects are not feasible, we extend 
the model with controls for time-stable differences in educational attainment, gender, and 
personality traits in column 3. Column 4 of Table 5 picks up the puzzling descriptive result 
above and estimates a model with an interaction of job search with life satisfaction to examine 
the group of fast-and-successful welfare leaves among the UB II workers. 
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Table 5: Cox proportional hazard model: UB II episodes ending in regular work 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Estimation 
includes all episodes that are right-censored and episodes that show regular employment (without 
UB II) after the occurrence of exit from UB II. 
Recall that the outcome is that of workers successfully leaving UB II for a regular job 
without transfers. We estimate the factors that affect the duration in the UB II welfare while 
working status until it terminates. First, column 1 validates that there is no significant 
correlation between life satisfaction and duration in UB II. This result holds for estimations 
(2) and (3) that condition on the set of time-varying and time-stable covariates. Significant 
hazard ratios of the covariates are consistent with the job search theory. So, UB II workers 
with longer tenure also have a lower hazard ratio and remain in the UB II jobs longer. Fixed-
term contracts prolong the process of leaving welfare successfully as do biographies with 
more prior transfer experiences. In particular, the trait of extraversion seems to foster the 
process of leaving UB II while still having a job.  
Dependent: Hazard of exit UB II (in days) Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err.
Life satisfaction 1.0251 0.0261 1.0315 0.0428 0.9141 0.0737 0.8485 ** 0.0801
Job search = 1 0.7928 0.2634
Job search = 1 × Life Satisfaction 1.2287 0.1816
Monthly household income (ln) 0.9468 0.2685 0.7377 0.3253 0.7305 0.3329
Hours 1.0415 ** 0.0167 1.0922 *** 0.0269 1.0836 *** 0.0271
Hours (sq) 0.9998 0.0002 0.9995 0.0003 0.9996 0.0003
Tenure 0.7937 *** 0.0489 0.7029 *** 0.0922 0.6930 *** 0.0947
Tenure (sq) 1.0102 *** 0.0022 1.0152 *** 0.0040 1.0157 *** 0.0040
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.8513 0.1650 0.5346 ** 0.2437 0.5212 *** 0.2466
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.7663 0.2241 1.2549 0.3531 1.2382 0.3585
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.8855 0.1506 1.2014 0.2426 1.1856 0.2374
Job requirements: Level 3 0.5586 * 0.3475 0.3886 ** 0.4521 0.4130 * 0.4636
Job requirements: Level 4 1.5367 0.3868 5.5515 *** 0.5960 5.6440 *** 0.6170
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 1.8980 ** 0.2553 2.7807 ** 0.4329 3.0675 *** 0.4302
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.6979 * 0.1898 0.8318 0.2588 0.8358 0.2504
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.9788 0.1821 0.9830 0.2740 0.9769 0.2704
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 1.9378 ** 0.2591 4.4808 *** 0.4577 4.1928 *** 0.4409
Establishment: 2000+ employees 1.5534 0.4457 0.8582 0.9793 0.8799 0.9778
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years 0.9887 0.2230 0.8539 0.3506 0.8535 0.3561
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years 0.9400 0.2044 1.0362 0.3321 1.0505 0.3381
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years 0.9236 0.2031 0.9945 0.3319 0.9968 0.3379
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.8913 0.1756 0.7482 0.2316 0.7244 0.2307
Number of children in household 1.0422 0.0782 0.9878 0.1291 0.9838 0.1319
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) 1.4084 * 0.1920 1.2612 0.3636 1.2211 0.3704
Age bracket: 43-51 1.0517 0.1944 1.3535 0.3222 1.3661 0.3333
Age bracket: 52-61 0.8818 0.2189 0.7223 0.3676 0.7029 0.3789
Number of doctoral consultations 1.0015 0.0267 0.9992 0.0217 1.0035 0.0229
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes 1.0721 *** 0.0243 1.0397 0.0369 1.0360 0.0372
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) 0.8069 *** 0.0282 0.6912 *** 0.0498 0.6854 *** 0.0503
Gender: Male 0.5460 ** 0.2839 0.5352 ** 0.2770
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 1-2 1.0849 0.2791 1.0492 0.2833
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 4-6 0.4564 ** 0.3369 0.4365 ** 0.3403
Big Five personality trait: extraversion 1.2903 * 0.1502 1.2762 * 0.1474
Big Five personality trait: agreeableness 0.8917 0.1328 0.9082 0.1348
Big Five personality trait: conscientiousness 0.8010 0.2260 0.8413 0.2326
Big Five personality trait: neuroticism 1.1440 0.1424 1.1116 0.1401
Big Five personality trait: openness 1.4184 * 0.2066 1.3874 0.2158
Number of subjects =
Number of observations =
Number of failures =
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In column 4, we examine why UB II workers reporting that they search for a job remain 
longer in the status. The baseline hazard ratio of life satisfaction for non-searching individuals 
is significantly and below one. Those non-searching UB II workers have a longer duration in 
UB II before leaving the status depending on the life satisfaction level. The higher their 
satisfaction level is, the longer they remain in UB II. However, the episodes of searching 
individuals seem not to be influenced by this inverse association of satisfaction with the 
duration in the welfare while working status. An explanation is that at the time of the 
interview, the seeking individuals are already anticipating the future change of job and, 
therefore, their satisfaction can no longer influence the duration of future employment 
transition. These findings are replicated by a Weibull estimation (see Table A6 in the 
Appendix).  
As an interim conclusion, we show that life satisfaction plays – if at all – a subordinate 
role for the duration until leaving UB II successfully. Only for particular groups, like non-
searching UB II workers that will leave UB II soon, life satisfaction may have a role. 
7. Discussion 
Lower life satisfaction of UB II workers is ceteris paribus associated with a higher likelihood 
of on-the-job search. This finding is in line with results for employees without welfare 
transfers who report lower job satisfaction, which leads to a job search. Self-reported 
intentions to quit (Scott et al. 2006, Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009), on-the-job search 
(Delfgaauw 2007), and actual quitting (Clark 2001, Green 2010) become more likely if job 
satisfaction declines. We find that this also holds after controlling for household income and 
individual earnings, which have the same negative sign as life satisfaction (see Table A4 in 
the Appendix). In this respect, the findings reinforce the notion that the welfare assessment of 
a job and the subsequent turnover decisions depend on pecuniary and non-pecuniary job 
attributes alike. Given the ceteris paribus character of the estimation, the on-the-job search of 
UB II workers is affected by life satisfaction beyond the role of individual earnings and 
household income, with this being important for joint decisions on labor supply. Searching for 
a job becomes attractive if either income or non-monetary aspects deteriorate. 
Taking the heterogeneity of UB II workers into account shows that the association of life 
satisfaction and job search depends on the institutional setting. ME UB II workers are the 
source of the negative coefficient of life satisfaction. These workers have a higher likelihood 
of searching for another job. A prominent difference to regular employed UB II workers is 
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that the ME UB II workers work fewer hours and earn less. More leisure goes hand in hand 
with a relatively relaxed time constraint, leaving more time for the costly job search (Knabe et 
al. 2010). Lower earnings leave space for substantially higher outside earnings, also making 
the job search relatively more attractive than for higher earning regular UB II workers. 
Regularly employed workers can hardly leave UB II by working more hours as they often 
work (close to) full-time or their family context imposes high levels of neediness (for 
instance, for single parents); thus, they cannot hope to overcome welfare dependency by 
finding a slightly better-paid job. A survey on the reasons for not searching for another job 
confirms this different motive. Regular employed UB II workers refuse to search for another 
job due to “little financial gains from finding another job,” whereas ME UB II workers do not 
search due to feelings of resignation or mental health issues (Bruckmeier et al. 2015). Time 
and monetary constraints define the space that non-monetary life satisfaction has as a 
predictor of labor market behavior. 
The second outcome is the duration until a UB II worker leaves welfare for a regular job. 
We do not find an association between life satisfaction and time elapsed until leaving welfare 
for those who leave welfare. For UB II workers, searching, and the actual successful exit from 
welfare do not coincide. This is in contrast to Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2015), who describe 
a similar effect of life satisfaction on searching for and finding a job. Other papers also find 
that finding a job is not accelerated by reduced life satisfaction (Gielen and van Ours 2014, 
Krug, Drasch, and Jungbauer-Gans 2019). One explanation may be two opposing effects 
reflected in life satisfaction. As satisfaction captures welfare stigma, this makes the UB II 
status relatively costly (Hetschko, Schöb, and Wolf 2020). Hence, the likelihood of searching 
for another job increases. However, life satisfaction may also reflect the negative impact of 
welfare stigma in terms of the reduced employability found for unemployed welfare recipients 
(Contini and Richiardi 2012). Consequently, the reduced employability keeps workers in the 
current job as their search becomes less effective, and the likelihood of finding a new job 
decreases. Such a dilemma situation is, for instance, observed in the case of Finnish workers 
with poor working conditions. They search for another job, but actual job switches are 
hampered due to their poor employability (Böckerman et al. 2013). Finding the negative 
coefficients for the obligation to work points in the same direction as in the face of this 
activation policy, the UB II workers show a negative association with the life satisfaction 
coefficient. This means that welfare stigma may have an impact beyond the intended 
activation via life satisfaction. 
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Papers on employees often use job satisfaction to account for non-monetary job amenities. 
We show that UB II workers’ general life satisfaction is also associated with behavioral 
consequences. A systematic comparison of the predictive power of subjective indicators for 
employees that are no sub-indicators of job satisfaction is rare. An exception is Green (2010), 
who shows that different SWB measures affect labor turnover similarly. However, job 
satisfaction predicts job mobility better than experienced well-being.10 From this paper, we 
can learn that job satisfaction of employees exposed to welfare stigma (but also other forms of 
psychological stress such as ethnic discrimination) could be too narrow as a predictor for 
labor market behavior. 
8. Concluding remarks 
This study deals with the effects of life satisfaction on the labor market behavior of 
employees receiving welfare. We examine the extent to which life satisfaction alters the 
likelihood of searching for a new job and the welfare duration of those workers who leave 
welfare dependency. UB II workers experiencing a reduction in life satisfaction are more 
likely to search for a new job. This effect goes beyond monetary incentives and unobserved, 
but time-stable, personality traits of the in-work benefit workers. The findings suggest that the 
institutional framework of the welfare system, roughly speaking, splits the UB II workers into 
two groups of different regulatory regimes: marginally employed workers and regularly 
employed workers, with both groups receiving in-work benefits. Only the search behavior of 
the former is affected by changes in life satisfaction. The duration of the successfully ended 
transfer period is not affected by workers’ life satisfaction. 
The heterogeneity of the UB II workers in the role of life satisfaction is remarkable. It 
suggests that a unified framework for the behavioral consequences of life satisfaction needs to 
take institutional characteristics, like a marginal employment contract, into account. General 
life satisfaction correlates with welfare stigma and other hard-to-observe factors, and it seems 
to matter for the decision to search. Hence, it is reasonable to use it in future studies as a 
covariate to account for these factors. Moreover, if there are measures for welfare stigma and 
life satisfaction together available, the relevance of an indirect life satisfaction channel and 
direct stigma channel for search behavior seems a promising research direction.  
 
10 The experienced well-being scales are called subjective well-being and measure feelings on the Depression–
Enthusiasm and the Anxiety–Comfort axis.  
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Appendix 
A1 Description of variables 
 




On-the-job search (JS) PASS-Survey Based on the question: "In the past four weeks, have you been looking for  (1) a different job , 
(2) an additional job , (3) no job at all  (4) an additional as well as for a different job ?". (3) 
was coded as "0" while (1), (2), and (4) are coded as "1".
Life satisfaction (LS) PASS-Survey Based on the question: "In general, how satisfied are you currently with your life on the 
whole? ‘0’ means, that you are ‘very dissatisfied’, ‘10’ means that you are ‘very satisfied’. 
The numbers ‘1’ through ‘9’ allow you to grade your assessment."
Disposable household income (y) PASS-Survey Monthly net income of the household from PASS variable hhincome .  
Actual working hours per week (h) PASS-Survey The weekly actual working hours (azges2 ), in the case of marginal employment (PET 0700 ) as 
it was asked separately. 
Tenure (days / 365) Administrative records Number of days within the same establishment at the date of interview at the respective PASS 
wave. To obtain easy-to-interpret coefficients transformed to years.
Fixed-term contract Survey and 
administrative records
The source variable "befrist " (from PASS) and "befrist " (from PASS-ADIAB) each cover only 
a subset of the UB II target group. While PASS only asks whether there is an employment 
contract if there is a regular employment relationship (otherwise filter), PASS-ADIAB reduces 
the number of cases as not all administrative information are actually filled. Specifically, the 
administrative information based on the occupational classification KldB2010 allows only a 
coverage of the limited number of spells that end after 30th November 2011 due to conversion 
of data processing. By combining both source variables, the prevalence of an fixed-term 
employment contract is approximated by a only a few losses of observations.
Marginal employment (ME) Administrative records Dummy variable, which takes the employment level from the variable erwstat = 109. The 
marginal employment is the main employment.
Job requirements Administrative records Skill level requirements of an occupation assigned by the "Classification of Occupations 2010" 
of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit by the tasks carried out in the job. Level 1 is assistant and 
training tasks, level 2 are specialized tasks, level 3 are complex tasks, and level 4 are highly 
complex tasks (own translation of the German task bundles of the occupations).
Active member of trade union PASS-Survey Self-reported answer on the question of active engagement in trade union.
Establishment: Time since first appearance Administrative records Current year minus the year of first appearance of the establishment  number in the dataset. The 
four categories are (1) < 5 year, (2) 5-9 years, (3) 10-19 years, and (4) 20+ years.
Establishment: Number of employees Administrative records Total number of an establishment’s employees reported to the social security agencies as of 30 
June of a year. (1) 1-20 Employees; (2) 21-100 employees, (3) 101-500 employees, (4) 501-
2000 employees, and (5) 2000+ employees.
Cohabitation PASS-Survey Partner is living in the same household (married or unmarried).
Number of children in own household PASS-Survey Number of children living in the same household.
Age bracket PASS-Survey The age control collapsed to four age brackets since an annual change of age otherwise forms 
with annual fixed effects almost perfect collinearity. The age groups are (1) 18-32, (2) 33-42, 
(3) 43-51and (4) 53-65.
Doctoral consultations PASS-Survey Number of doctoral consultations within the last 3 months.
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes Administrative records Total number of transfer episodes in the whole employment biography since the first record in 
the administrative data.
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) Administrative records Total number of (days/365) in UB II since the 1st January 2005.
County identifier Administrative records Based on a 5-digit county indentifier in "wo_kreis ".
Number of Jobcenter contacts PASS-Survey Based on the question: "How many times have you personally been to the Jobcenter since 
your household has been obtaining unemployment benefit 2 (“Arbeitslosengeld 2”)?"
Jobcenter: Obligation to search for a job PASS-Survey Based on the question: "Not everyone who obtains unemployment benefit 2 (”Arbeitslosengeld 
2”) is expected by the Job centre to look for work, for example because this person is 58 
years of age or older, looks after children, cares for relatives or is ill. How about you? Does 
the Job centre expect you to look for work?" Answers: (1) Yes, the Job centre expect me to 
look for work,  (2) No, the Job centre does not expect me to look for work and I don’t look, 
(3) No, the Job centre does not expect me to look for work but I look nevertheless.  (2) and (3) 
as No (= 0).
Expectations: Worries about future job loss PASS-Survey Based on the question: "To what extent are you worried that you could lose your job?"  (1) 
very worried , (2) somewhat worried , (3) slightly worried only , (4) not worried at all. 
Reference category (= 0) are workers with little or no worries to lose the job ((3) + (4)). 
Workers with less favorable future expectations ((1) + (2)) are coded (1).
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A2 Job search of UB II workers and life satisfaction - conditional logit estimations 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table 
replicates the estimations of table 2 with a conditional logit estimator. The maximum likelihood 
estimation for column 3 (adding county-specific fixed effects) does not converge. The number of 
observations reports all UB II workers who experienced at least one within-person change on the 
outcome variable job search over time.   
  
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.1512 *** 0.0516 -0.1020 * 0.0578
Monthly household income (ln) -0.3109 0.2719
Hours -0.1112 *** 0.0374
Hours (sq) 0.0016 ** 0.0007
Tenure 0.1661 0.1116
Tenure (sq) -0.0021 0.0080
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.3851 0.3080
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 1.3460 *** 0.3821
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0878 0.3387
Job requirements: Level 3 0.0067 1.0050
Job requirements: Level 4 1.0297 0.9201
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 0.4021 0.5813
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.1096 0.3740
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.5209 0.3748
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 0.3580 0.6265
Establishment: 2000+ employees -1.2004 1.3194
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.6523 * 0.3397
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.5689 0.3637
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.4207 0.3904
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.1913 0.6091
Number of children in household 0.2127 0.3452
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0697 0.6909
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.3501 0.4881
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.3473 0.7293
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0014 0.2148
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.3282 0.9339
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A3 Job search of UB II workers - Institutions - conditional logit estimations 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table 
replicates the estimations of table 3 with a conditional logit estimator. The number of observations 
reports all UB II workers who experienced at least one within-person change on the outcome 
variable job search over time.
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.0512 0.0728 -0.1541 * 0.0909 -0.0712 0.1912
ME = 1 × Life satisfaction -0.1806 ** 0.0917
Number of contacts to Jobcenter 0.1100 0.5653
Jobcenter: Obligation to search for a job = 1 1.1746 *** 0.3234
Expectations: Worries about future job loss = 1 0.9838 * 0.5490
Monthly household income (ln) -0.3176 0.2740 -0.1503 0.4388 -3.1304 1.9320
Hours -0.1104 *** 0.0374 -0.1070 * 0.0576 -0.4098 ** 0.1764
Hours (sq) 0.0016 ** 0.0007 0.0013 0.0051 0.0103 ** 0.0051
Tenure 0.1796 0.1127 0.2248 0.1786 0.5173 0.5189
Tenure (sq) -0.0028 0.0080 -0.0048 0.0113 -0.0149 0.0304
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.3870 0.3080 0.3742 0.4809 0.1563 1.2252
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 2.1690 *** 0.8281 1.3009 ** 0.5422 2.6348 2.6645
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0657 0.3401 -0.5924 0.5858 -0.5240 1.8655
Job requirements: Level 3 -0.0026 1.0032 0.3648 1.4692
Job requirements: Level 4 1.0503 0.9201 -0.0432 1.3612
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 0.4123 0.5809 -0.2382 0.8732 -16.4086 2,736.42
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.1268 0.3740 -0.7815 0.6532 -1.9895 1.6086
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.5511 0.3762 -1.1115 * 0.5906 -0.0326 1.3695
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 0.4014 0.6292 -1.1068 0.9853 18.5897 1,743.95
Establishment: 2000+ employees -1.1597 1.3274 -16.2326 1,314.73
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.6212 * 0.3414 -0.8000 0.6021 -2.3416 2.3114
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.5511 0.3640 -2.0504 *** 0.7169 -0.7243 1.0954
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.4118 0.3913 -1.4722 ** 0.6544 -1.2851 2.3597
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.1576 0.6097 -0.7906 1.3640 -3.4764 2.9738
Number of children in household 0.2278 0.3462 1.2325 ** 0.6158 1.0700 1.6258
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0670 0.6895 -2.5889 * 1.4103 15.6476 2,182.01
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.3580 0.4893 -0.0399 0.6605 -0.0530 1.6538
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.3336 0.7307 0.7694 1.0614 -3.5287 3.2724
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0031 0.0171 -0.0165 0.0333 0.0371 0.0729
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.3397 0.2150 -0.0564 0.3889 -1.1297 1.1294
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A4  Sensitivity analysis: job search and lagged life satisfaction and earnings 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.0203 ** 0.0091 -0.0258 *** 0.0092 -0.0112 0.0100 -0.0100 0.0100 -0.0100 0.0100
Life satisfaction (t-1) -0.0174 * 0.0090 -0.0231 ** 0.0092
Monthly gross earnings (ln) -0.1213 ** 0.0509 -0.1224 ** 0.0513
Monthly household income (ln) 0.0124 0.0408 0.0056 0.0399 0.0068 0.0408 0.0015 0.0454 0.0119 0.0442
Hours -0.0139 ** 0.0056 -0.0144 ** 0.0057 -0.0136 ** 0.0056 -0.0185 *** 0.0067 -0.0143 ** 0.0072 -0.0143 ** 0.0072
Hours (sq) 0.0002 * 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002 * 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0001
Tenure -0.0030 0.0140 -0.0020 0.0139 -0.0026 0.0138 0.0194 0.0142 0.0200 0.0140 0.0199 0.0140
Tenure (sq) 0.0005 0.0009 0.0004 0.0010 0.0005 0.0009 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0008
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.0416 0.0460 0.0418 0.0461 0.0454 0.0456 0.0138 0.0453 0.0143 0.0446 0.0144 0.0446
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.1924 *** 0.0663 0.1972 *** 0.0662 0.1866 *** 0.0662 0.1095 0.0839 0.0593 0.0857 0.0574 0.0859
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0271 0.0526 0.0275 0.0523 0.0225 0.0516 -0.0263 0.0508 -0.0239 0.0507 -0.0243 0.0507
Job requirements: Level 3 0.0703 0.1175 0.0659 0.1202 0.0644 0.1187 0.0299 0.1169 0.0097 0.1114 0.0099 0.1115
Job requirements: Level 4 0.0366 0.0609 0.0444 0.0652 0.0525 0.0616 0.0711 0.1084 0.0748 0.1130 0.0741 0.1127
Active trade union member (yes = 1) -0.0510 0.0583 -0.0374 0.0623 -0.0404 0.0620 0.0197 0.0665 0.0164 0.0658 0.0165 0.0659
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.0096 0.0574 0.0089 0.0579 0.0055 0.0576 0.1165 * 0.0595 0.0998 * 0.0589 0.1003 * 0.0591
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.0077 0.0681 0.0106 0.0681 0.0054 0.0677 0.1006 0.0751 0.0978 0.0743 0.0981 0.0744
Establishment: 501-2000 employees -0.0355 0.0968 -0.0319 0.0962 -0.0316 0.0970 0.0534 0.1162 0.0477 0.1138 0.0479 0.1138
Establishment: 2000+ employees -0.3634 0.2295 -0.3390 0.2210 -0.3323 0.2249 -0.3311 0.2655 -0.3528 0.2676 -0.3529 0.2672
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.0478 0.0569 -0.0430 0.0570 -0.0471 0.0568 -0.0340 0.0638 -0.0285 0.0633 -0.0293 0.0638
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.0150 0.0535 -0.0193 0.0538 -0.0223 0.0534 -0.0452 0.0561 -0.0405 0.0558 -0.0406 0.0558
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.0204 0.0653 -0.0170 0.0658 -0.0275 0.0649 0.0020 0.0723 0.0075 0.0721 0.0077 0.0719
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.0658 0.0870 0.0668 0.0843 0.0446 0.0856 0.0265 0.0913 0.0329 0.0965 0.0352 0.0976
Number of children in household 0.0328 0.0471 0.0324 0.0473 0.0271 0.0471 0.0372 0.0448 0.0345 0.0451 0.0332 0.0450
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0713 0.0869 -0.0592 0.0865 -0.0640 0.0863 -0.0228 0.0737 -0.0246 0.0748 -0.0243 0.0749
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.1429 0.0918 -0.1482 0.0911 -0.1517 * 0.0905 -0.0279 0.0913 -0.0417 0.0904 -0.0419 0.0905
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.0995 0.1169 -0.1064 0.1166 -0.0970 0.1167 0.0057 0.1149 -0.0112 0.1141 -0.0118 0.1143
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0012 0.0033 -0.0006 0.0033 -0.0006 0.0032 -0.0015 0.0030 -0.0021 0.0031 -0.0021 0.0031
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.0420 * 0.0224 -0.0437 * 0.0225 -0.0459 ** 0.0222 -0.0413 ** 0.0183 -0.0401 ** 0.0184 -0.0403 ** 0.0184
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) -0.0273 0.0363 -0.0267 0.0366 -0.0251 0.0360 -0.0104 0.0377 -0.0088 0.0377 -0.0092 0.0378
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A5 Sensitivity analysis: job search of marginal employed UB II workers 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The sum of 
the observations from column (2) and column (3) is N = 3,991. 25 workers are excluded from the 
analysis as they could not clearly assigned to one status only. 
  
Dependent: Pr (JS = 1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Life satisfaction -0.0050 0.0089 -0.0216 * 0.0849 -0.0095 0.0103
ME = 1 × Life satisfaction -0.0323 *** 0.0110
Monthly household income (ln) -0.0318 0.0339 -0.0543 0.0596 -0.0088 0.0429
Hours -0.0131 *** 0.0040 -0.0096 0.0062 -0.0200 *** 0.0071
Hours (sq) 0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 *** 0.0001
Tenure 0.0163 0.0113 0.0059 0.0262 0.0229 * 0.0138
Tenure (sq) -0.0002 0.0008 0.0013 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0008
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.0474 0.0372 0.1025 0.0932 0.0073 0.0447
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.4108 *** 0.1029
Job requirements: Level 1 (Reference: Level 2) 0.0071 0.0416 0.0843 0.0819 -0.0208 0.0524
Job requirements: Level 3 -0.0719 0.0929 0.2332 0.1784 0.0331 0.1084
Job requirements: Level 4 0.1043 0.0887 0.2028 * 0.1172 0.0136 0.1245
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 0.0459 0.0633 0.0088 0.2074 0.0766 0.0614
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.0673 0.0495 -0.1335 0.1200 0.1121 ** 0.0569
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.1016 * 0.0575 0.1663 0.1214 0.0562 0.0727
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 0.0506 0.0713 -0.1270 0.1340 0.1033 0.1115
Establishment: 2000+ employees -0.2480 0.1935 -0.3876 0.3512 -0.3108 0.2798
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years -0.0716 0.0459 -0.1734 ** 0.0823 -0.0235 0.0647
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years -0.0532 0.0406 -0.0262 0.0700 -0.0124 0.0535
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years -0.0620 0.0520 -0.0734 0.0898 -0.0038 0.0694
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 0.0296 0.0658 -0.0288 0.0673 -0.0331 * 0.0194
Number of children in household 0.0234 0.0367 -0.1562 *** 0.0586 0.0118 0.0378
Age bracket: 18-32 (Reference: 33-42) -0.0179 0.0676 0.1699 * 0.0951 0.0491 0.0948
Age bracket: 43-51 -0.0659 0.0698 0.0111 0.0793 0.0449 0.0441
Age bracket: 52-61 -0.0649 0.0931 0.3457 * 0.1976 -0.0361 0.1034
Number of doctoral consultations (last three months) -0.0007 0.0025 -0.0853 0.1017 -0.0528 0.0904
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes -0.0336 ** 0.0170 -0.1764 0.1705 -0.0189 0.1085
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) -0.0354 0.0314 0.0034 0.0045 -0.0030 0.0029
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A6 Sensitivity analysis: Duration model with Weibull distribution 
 
Source: PASS-ADIAB, version 7515, own calculations. 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Dependent: Hazard of exit UB II (in days) Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err.
Life satisfaction 1.0283 0.0266 1.0399 0.0429 0.9200 0.0722 0.8575 ** 0.0783
Job search = 1 0.8273 0.2579
Job search = 1 × Life Satisfaction 1.2194 0.1789
Monthly household income (ln) 0.9852 0.2608 0.7135 0.3151 0.7062 0.3189
Hours 1.0409 ** 0.0169 1.0773 *** 0.0251 1.0712 *** 0.0255
Hours (sq) 0.9998 0.0002 0.9996 0.0003 0.9997 0.0003
Tenure 0.7779 *** 0.0496 0.7067 *** 0.0870 0.6961 *** 0.0899
Tenure (sq) 1.0111 *** 0.0023 1.0152 *** 0.0038 1.0158 *** 0.0039
Fixed-term contract (yes = 1) 0.8480 0.1666 0.5281 *** 0.2403 0.5182 *** 0.2425
Marginal Employment (yes = 1) 0.7868 0.2269 1.1994 0.3585 1.1990 0.3638
Job requirements: Level 1 0.8961 0.1510 1.1190 0.2229 1.0983 0.2187
Job requirements: Level 3 0.5362 * 0.3383 0.3756 ** 0.4003 0.3967 ** 0.4029
Job requirements: Level 4 1.5726 0.3952 5.0600 *** 0.5767 5.0771 *** 0.5960
Active trade union member (yes = 1) 1.9457 *** 0.2563 2.8446 ** 0.4356 3.1419 *** 0.4355
Establishment: 1-20 employees 0.7002 * 0.1924 0.8236 0.2521 0.8300 0.2427
Establishment: 101-500 employees 0.9862 0.1870 1.0933 0.2758 1.0979 0.2692
Establishment: 501-2000 employees 1.9579 ** 0.2659 4.4981 *** 0.4408 4.3389 *** 0.4155
Establishment: 2000+ employees 1.6504 0.4639 0.8324 0.9592 0.8796 0.9523
Establishment: Time since first appearance: < 5 years 1.0071 0.2242 0.9858 0.3438 0.9826 0.3517
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 10-19 years 0.9437 0.2070 1.0044 0.3307 1.0243 0.3373
Establishment: Time since first appearance: 20+ years 0.9237 0.2031 0.9142 0.3353 0.9252 0.3402
Cohabitation (yes = 1) 1.0742 *** 0.0254 1.0421 0.0392 1.0378 0.0399
Number of children in household 0.8075 *** 0.0288 0.6974 *** 0.0485 0.6929 *** 0.0485
Age bracket: 18-32 0.9324 0.1731 0.7796 0.2300 0.7557 0.2259
Age bracket: 43-51 1.0429 0.0786 0.9795 0.1229 0.9769 0.1259
Age bracket: 52-61 1.4104 * 0.1925 1.4339 0.3425 1.4012 0.3497
Number of doctoral consultations 1.0023 0.0268 1.0000 0.0214 1.0038 0.0227
Biography: Total number of transfer episodes 1.0742 *** 0.0254 1.0421 0.0392 1.0378 0.0399
Since 2005: Total time in UB II (in years) 0.8075 *** 0.0288 0.6974 *** 0.0485 0.6929 *** 0.0485
Gender: Male 0.6012 * 0.2736 0.5909 ** 0.2668
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 1-2 0.9993 0.2815 0.9682 0.2863
Highest educational attainment: ISCED 4-6 0.5228 ** 0.3248 0.4993 ** 0.3280
Big Five personality trait: extraversion 1.2599 0.1446 1.2415 0.1425
Big Five personality trait: agreeableness 0.8843 0.1366 0.8958 0.1387
Big Five personality trait: conscientiousness 0.8225 0.2219 0.8652 0.2298
Big Five personality trait: neuroticism 1.0553 0.1349 1.0309 0.1328
Big Five personality trait: openness 1.4224 * 0.2107 1.3883 0.2168
Constant 0.0088 *** 0.1539 0.0017 2.0891 0.0027 2.7291 0.0037 2.7938




-1,305.0491 -978.9209 -523.6947 -521.9295
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2020/1  ASSEYER, Andreas: Wholesale price discrimination with regulatory asymmetry 
  Economics 
 
2020/2 JESSEN, Robin und Johannes KÖNIG: Hours Risk and Wage Risk: 
Repercussions over the Life-Cycle 
 Economics 
 
2020/3  ASSEYER, Andreas: Collusion and Delegation under Information Control 
  Economics 
 
2020/4 ADAM, Marc Christopher: Liquidating Bankers’ Acceptances: International 
Crisis, Doctrinal Conflict and American Exceptionalism in the Federal Reserve 
1913-1932 
  Economics 
 
2020/5 BÖNKE, Timm; Rick GLAUBITZ; Konstantin GÖBLER; Astrid HARNACK; 
Astrid PAPE und Miriam WETTER: Die Entwicklung und Prognose von 
Lebenserwerbseinkommen in Deutschland 
  Economics 
 
2020/6 HUNDSDOERFER, Jochen und Eva MATTHAEI:  Gender Discriminatory 
Taxes, Fairness Perception, and Labor Supply 
  FACTS 
 
2020/7 ZHU, Junbing und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS: Chinese Dialects, Revolutionary 
War & Economic Performance 
  Economics 
 
2020/8 POLUGODINA, Maria und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS: East Prussia 2.0: 
Persistent Regions, Rising Nations 
  Economics 
 
2020/9 DOMBI, Akos; Theocharis GRIGORIADIS und Junbing ZHU: Antiquity and 
capitalism: the finance-growth perspective 
  Economics 
 
2020/10 AHMED LAHSEN, Amina; Alan T. PIPER und Ida-Anna THIELE: Kim Jiyoung, 
Born 1982, and the Labour Market: Overeducation, Gender, Income and Life 
Satisfaction. Panel evidence from Korea 
  Economics 
  
2020/11 COLEMAN, Winnie und Dieter NAUTZ: The Credibility of the ECB’s Inflation 
Target in times of Corona: New Evidence from an Online Survey 
 Economics 
 
2020/12 SYDOW, Jörg; Georg SCHREYÖGG und Jochen KOCH: Current interest in the 
theory of organizational path dependence. a short update on the occasion of 
the 2019 AMR Decade Award 
 Management 
 
2020/13 DIECKELMANN, Daniel: Cross-Border Lending and the International 
Transmission of Banking Crises 
 Economics 
 
